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 We study the price adjustment of 4 petroleum products in the UK following crude oil 
price changes 
 
 We use the Nonlinear ARDL model to capture both short- and long-run asymmetries  
 
 We find that pre-tax prices generally adjust more rapidly upwards than downwards 
 
 Asymmetry is largely obscured at the pump where prices include both VAT and duty 
 
 This raises the possibility that firms can use the tax system to conceal rent seeking 
behaviour 
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Abstract
This paper investigates the adjustment of the prices of four key petroleum products in the
UK following changes in the price of crude oil. We find significant evidence that the pre-tax
prices of diesel, kerosene and gas oil adjust more rapidly in an upward than a downward
direction but that the pre-tax price of unleaded petrol adjusts symmetrically. However, these
patterns are obscured at the pump once one accounts for fuel duty and value added tax,
raising the possibility that firms can use the tax system to conceal rent seeking behaviour.
Keywords: Nonlinear ARDL (NARDL), Asymmetric Gasoline Price Adjustment, Rockets
and Feathers Hypothesis.
1. Introduction
A large literature has considered the issue of asymmetric price transmission (APT) from
crude oil markets to retail gasoline markets. Specifically, gasoline prices may react asym-
metrically to changes in the price of crude oil, which is the key upstream input into gasoline
production; an authoritative survey is provided by Grasso and Manera (2007). A number
of studies have found that retail gasoline prices rise more quickly following an increase in
the market price of crude oil than they would fall following an equivalent decrease. This
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)1904-433-757.
Email addresses: matthew.greenwood@unimelb.edu.au (Matthew Greenwood-Nimmo),
yongcheol.shin@york.ac.uk (Yongcheol Shin)
Preprint submitted to Economics Letters September 13, 2013
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
phenomenon has come to be referred to as the rockets and feathers hypothesis following
the early contribution of Bacon (1991).1 The purpose of that paper was to empirically test
the contention examined informally by the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission that
upward price adjustment is more rapid than downward adjustment, leading to periods in
which firms can earn excess profit. By employing an asymmetric partial adjustment model
assuming a quadratic adjustment process, Bacon finds evidence in support of the hypoth-
esised asymmetry. A number of studies have since considered the same issue with mixed
results. A notable contribution in support was made by Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert
(1997, BCG), who employ a hybrid error correction model where changes in gasoline and oil
prices are decomposed into positive and negative changes. However, their results have been
disputed by Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) on the grounds that BCG study low frequency
data and that they employ a ‘nonstandard estimation methodology’.
A closely related strand of literature has considered asymmetric pass-through of the
exchange rate to retail energy prices, reflecting the convention of quoting oil prices in US$
per barrel (US$/bbl). Using a simple asymmetric ECM, Reilly and Witt (1998) find that
a Sterling depreciation is rapidly passed through to higher prices at the pump but that
a strengthening of the Pound is not met by a commensurate reduction in retail prices.
Similarly, Asplund, Eriksson and Friberg (2000) find that Swedish retail gasoline prices
react more swiftly to the exchange rate than to the crude oil price while Galeotti, Lanza and
Manera (2003) find further evidence that the speed of equilibrium correction is asymmetric
with respect to both oil price and exchange rate shocks.
The literature surveyed above has two general shortcomings. Firstly, most of the existing
studies have employed the two-step Engle-Granger approach to estimating single-equation
ECMs. However, it is well-established that single-step fully dynamic ARDL estimation is
more efficient and yields improved performance as it does not suffer from any estimation
uncertainty or errors arising from estimation of the long-run cointegrating relation in a
1Various theoretical explanations for asymmetric price adjustment have been proposed in the literature,
the dominant three being oligopolistic pricing behaviour (Radchenko, 2005), inventory capacity and costs
(Borenstein and Shepard, 2002) and nonlinear consumer search-effort (Johnson, 2002).
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separate first step (Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith and Hendry, 1993; Banerjee, Dolado and
Mestre, 1998; Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001).2 Secondly, the majority of papers consider
only short-run dynamic asymmetries and abstract from potential long-run nonlinearity. This
may be a plausible simplification in a competitive market setting, but in general it should
be tested rather than assumed. Indeed, using a modified version of BCG’s framework to
analyse both short- and long-run asymmetries in upstream and downstream energy prices,
Balke, Brown, and Yu¨cel (1998, BBY) document ‘pervasive and large’ asymmetries. This
is a potentially significant observation, as Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2013, SYG)
demonstrate that estimation of the model dynamics will be profoundly compromised when
a nonlinear long-run relationship is mis-specified as linear.
In this paper, we revisit the question of APT in UK retail energy markets using the
Nonlinear ARDL approach developed by SYG. This represents a simple and innovative
asymmetric framework which combines single-step estimation with the capacity to accom-
modate both long-run and dynamic asymmetries by exploiting partial sum decompositions
of the explanatory variable.3 Using the NARDL framework, we consider APT from crude oil
price changes to the retail prices of four major petroleum products in the UK over the period
January 1999 – March 2013. Our results indicate that the long-run relationship is either
linear or only mildly asymmetric in all cases, indicating that retailers have generally passed
cost changes on to consumers approximately symmetrically in the long-run. However, the
speed of upward adjustment exceeds that of downward adjustment for derv, kerosene and
gas oil (aka red diesel) indicating a degree of downward price-stickiness consistent with the
rockets and feathers hypothesis. Our results are suggestive of a similar effect in the case
of unleaded petrol although the asymmetry is not statistically significant. Lastly, we show
that consumers who observe the pump price including tax and duty will only perceive asym-
2Another strand of the literature has analysed price transmission using the more efficient vector error
correction modelling framework. However, existing system models are not well suited to the joint analysis
of short- and long-run asymmetries in the relationship between the crude oil price and the prices of refined
petroleum products, which is our main interest here. We therefore confine our attention to the single
equation case where such asymmetries can be readily accommodated.
3Partial sum decompositions are employed by both BCG and BBY. However, they employ hybrid spec-
ifications that bear as much similarity to the hidden cointegration approach (e.g. Hornavar, 2009) as to
ours.
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metry in the case of kerosene where the tax/duty component is the lowest. This raises an
important antitrust issue as it suggests that oligopolistically competitive firms may exploit
UK tax legislation to conceal rent-seeking behaviour. This poses a challenge to regulators
who must monitor the interplay between pre- and post-tax prices as well as to policymakers
charged with the design and implementation of the system of fuel taxation.
2. The Nonlinear ARDL Model
The NARDL model proposed by SYG is among the simplest in the class of nonlinear
error correction models. It has the desirable attributes that it is linear in parameters,
it is readily estimable by OLS and it can accommodate combinations of persistent and
stationary variables in a coherent manner. The model is built around an asymmetric long-
run relationship of the form:
yt = β
+′x+t + β
−′x−t + ut, ∆xt = vt, (2.1)
where yt is a scalar I(1) variable, xt is a k × 1 vector of regressors defined such that xt =
x0+x
+
t +x
−
t where x0 is the initial value and where x
+
t =
∑t
j=1∆x
+
j =
∑t
j=1max (∆xj , 0)
and x−t =
∑t
j=1∆x
−
j =
∑t
j=1min (∆xj, 0) are partial sum processes of positive and negative
changes in xt. Following SYG, we assume a single known threshold value of zero to ensure
that the model retains a clear economic interpretation.4
The NARDL(p, q)-in-levels model embedding (2.1) is written as follows:
yt =
p∑
j=1
φjyt−j +
q∑
j=0
(
θ+′j x
+
t−j + θ
−′
j x
−
t−j
)
+ εt, (2.2)
where the φj ’s are autoregressive parameters, θ
+
j and θ
−
j contain the asymmetric distributed-
lag parameters, and εt is an iid process with zero mean and constant variance, σ
2
ε . The
associated error correction representation is:
4We find that decomposing the Brent spot price in this way results in an approximate 60:40 split of
observations in favour of the positive regime so we need not worry about estimation issues resulting from
large differences in the regime probabilities.
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∆yt = ρyt−1+θ
+′x+t−1+θ
−′x−t−1+
p−1∑
j=1
γj∆yt−j+
q−1∑
j=0
(
ϕ+′j ∆x
+
t−j +ϕ
−′
j ∆x
−
t−j
)
+ εt(2.3)
where ρ =
∑p
j=1 φj−1, γj = −
∑p
i=j+1 φi for j = 1, ..., p−1, θ+ =
∑q
j=0 θ
+
j , θ
− =
∑q
j=0 θ
−
j ,
ϕ+0 = θ
+
0 , ϕ
+
j = −
∑q
i=j+1 θ
+
j for j = 1, ..., q − 1, ϕ−0 = θ−0 , ϕ−j = −
∑q
i=j+1 θ
−
j for j =
1, ..., q − 1, and β+ = −θ+/ρ and β− = −θ−/ρ are the asymmetric long-run parameters.
By specifying a marginal DGP of the form, ∆xt =
∑q−1
j=1Λj∆xt−j + vt, and expressing εt
conditionally on vt such that εt = ω
′
(
∆xt −
∑q−1
j=1Λj∆xt−j
)
+ et where et is uncorrelated
with vt by construction, it is straightforward to derive the conditional nonlinear ECM as
follows:5
∆yt = ρyt−1+θ+′x+t−1+θ
−′x−t−1+
p−1∑
j=1
γj∆yt−j+
q−1∑
j=0
(
pi+′j ∆x
+
t−j + pi
−′
j ∆x
−
t−j
)
+ et(2.4)
where pi+0 = θ
+
0 +ω, pi
−
0 = θ
−
0 +ω, pi
+
j = ϕ
+
j −ω′Λj and pi−j = ϕ−j −ω′Λj for j = 1, ..., q−1.
Either of two tests for the existence of a stable long-run levels relationship may be used.
The tBDM -statistic proposed by Banerjee et al. (1998) testsH0: ρ = 0 againstH1: ρ < 0 while
the FPSS-statistic developed by Pesaran et al. (2001, PSS) tests the joint null H0: ρ = θ
+ =
θ− = 0. The bounds testing approach of PSS provides a means to achieve valid inference
in the presence of both stationary and nonstationary variables, a feature which SYG note is
highly desirable in the presence of partial sum decompositions which may exhibit complex
interdependencies. At a practical level SYG suggest counting the regressors in xt prior to
decomposition when selecting the appropriate critical values from those tabulated in PSS to
ensure conservatism.
The specification in (2.4) is the most general form, admitting both long- and short-
run asymmetries. The null hypotheses of long-run symmetry
(
β+ = β−
)
can be evaluated
using a standard Wald test. Short-run symmetry restrictions can take either of two forms:
pi+i = pi
−
i for all i = 0, ..., q − 1 or
∑q−1
i=0 pi
+
i =
∑q−1
i=0 pi
−
i , both of which may be tested using
standard Wald tests – we will focus on the less restrictive additive case. Furthermore, in
5(2.4) corrects perfectly for the potential weak endogeneity of nonstationary explanatory variables, a
feature that may be important given that the UK economy has non-negligible oil extraction and refining
activity.
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keeping with much of the existing literature, we will also evaluate the symmetry of the impact
multipliers (i.e. H0: pi
+
0 = pi
−
0 ). Finally, SYG show that the asymmetric dynamic multiplier
effects on yt associated with unit changes in x
+
t and x
−
t can be computed recursively from
the parameters of the NARDL-in-levels representation, (2.2).
3. Estimation Results
Our dataset comprises 171 monthly observations from January 1999 to March 2013 on the
spot price of Brent crude oil (£/bbl) and the retail price of unleaded petrol, derv, kerosene
and gas oil, both pre-tax and duty (hereafter PTD) and inclusive of tax and duty (ITD),
measured in pence per litre.6 The data are converted into indices (2000Y=100) and logged
prior to estimation.
Figure 1(a) shows the relatively close comovement between the crude oil price and the
four PTD product prices. A closer inspection of the data reveals that the rate inflation of
the crude oil price over our sample period has been considerably higher on average and also
more volatile than the inflation rates of the refined products, particularly when the latter
are quoted on a PTD basis (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics of annual inflation rates for
each variable). Interestingly, both the mean and standard deviation of PTD price inflation
have been much lower for road fuels than non-road fuels while no such pattern is visible in
the case of ITD price inflation. This is suggestive of PTD price-smoothing in the case of
road fuels.
Figure 1(b) plots the proportion of the end-user price which is accounted for by VAT
and duty, and reveals that road fuels are much more heavily taxed than non-road fuels.7
6The Brent spot price is converted from US$/bbl to £/bbl using the period average exchange rate – both
series are downloaded from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Our decision to convert the spot
price into Sterling rather than to include both the dollar-denominated series and the bilateral exchange rate
was informed by initial experimentation with the data in which the exchange rate was rarely found to be
significant. This may reflect the UK’s position as a major oil trader with considerable domestic reserves.
The PTD and ITD price series are sourced from the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change via
the Office for National Statistics.
7While road fuels are liable to VAT at the standard rate (currently 20%), domestic non-road fuels are
subject to a reduced rate (currently 5%). Similarly, road fuels attract higher duty than non-road fuels in
the UK.
6
The proportion of duty gradually increases reflecting the controversial escalator system that
governed changes in fuel duty in the UK for much of our sample. This has introduced an
autonomous upward drift into ITD prices unrelated to input costs which is likely to weaken
the extent to which ITD prices track crude oil prices. Since most consumers will only observe
ITD prices, this suggests that they may perceive that the linkage between crude oil prices and
refined product prices is weaker than it in fact is. Furthermore, consumers may either fail
to perceive asymmetric price adjustments by firms or they may perceive ‘false’ asymmetries
related to changes in duty and unrelated to firms’ pricing decisions. Public perceptions
of the nature and equity of fuel price changes are likely to be of interest to policymakers
given that fuel demand is highly inelastic and it accounts for a non-negligible proportion
of the average British household’s consumption basket. Moreover, the three significant fuel
protests that have been staged since 2000 underscore that fuel pricing is a highly sensitive
political issue.
– TABLE 1 & FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE –
Table 2 summarises our key estimation results. We present results for eight NARDL
models which capture the (asymmetric) transmission of crude oil price changes to both the
PTD and ITD prices of each of the four refined petroluem products that we consider.8 Figure
2 plots the associated cumulative dynamic multipliers. Focusing initially on the PTD re-
sults, we find that the speed of adjustment is somewhat sluggish at 29-37% per month, with
slightly higher values associated with road fuels than non-road fuels. Sluggish adjustment is
associated with relatively prolonged periods of mispricing and is often considered indicative
of weak competition. We find no evidence of long-run asymmetry for road fuels but sig-
nificant evidence that PTD non-road fuel prices react somewhat more strongly to negative
8General-to-specific lag selection was employed starting with pmax = qmax = 5 using a unidirectional 5%
decision rule. As a robustness check, we also estimated the models using the two-step Engle-Granger (EG)
framework with general-to-specific lag selection in the second step. The estimation results are qualitatively
similar in both cases. The principal differences are as follows: (i) the EG framework provides no support for
cointegration in the ITD case for either unleaded petrol or derv; (ii) the EG long-run coefficients are consid-
erably smaller than the equivalent NARDL estimates; and (iii) the speed of error correction is substantially
slower in the EG case than the NARDL case. Full estimation results are available on request.
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than positive crude oil price changes in the long-run (this effect may relate to differences in
market structure, as discussed below). In economic terms, the asymmetry is modest but it
nevertheless cautions against the use of untested long-run linearity restrictions, especially
as long-run mis-specifications can seriously jeopardise estimation of the ECM dynamics.
– TABLE 2 & FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE –
We find a long-run coefficient of approximately 0.8 for both unleaded petrol and derv,
indicating that consumers are somewhat insulated from fluctuations in the crude oil market
in the long-run. This result is consistent with the estimates reported by BCG and also with
the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1. Given our finding of long-run symmetry in
these cases, there is no evidence of long-run rent-seeking behaviour. Interestingly, we find
evidence of a considerably stronger long-run linkage between crude oil prices and the PTD
prices of kerosene and gas oil. The distinction between the long-run pricing behaviour of
road and non-road fuels may reflect differences in the structure of their respective markets.
Non-road fuels are typically delivered in large average volumes directly to the customer at
a relatively low frequency, subject to a medium-term contractual agreement. This setting
may furnish the buyer with additional bargaining power and provides a greater reward to
consumer search effort than in the case of road fuels, factors that will lead sellers to strongly
pass on beneficial cost shocks. Similarly, the large average sales volume and low frequency
of transactions will reduce the seller’s incentive (and perhaps their ability) to absorb adverse
cost shocks, indicating that these too will be passed on strongly.
We find significant evidence of additively asymmetric dynamic adjustment in all cases
except unleaded petrol. Our results indicate that a crude oil price increase is passed through
more forcefully than a price decrease in the periods immediately following the shock. The
asymmetry arises on impact for derv but with a mild lag for the non-road fuels. These
results determine the shape of the dynamic multipliers in the left column of Figure 2, where
we observe a strong and rapid reaction to positive changes but a more gradual response to
negative changes. The heavy dashed red line in each figure plots the difference between the
effect of a one percent positive shock and a one percent negative shock to the crude oil spot
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price on the price of the refined product, while the light dashed lines provide two standard
error intervals. This representation provides a stark illustration of the rockets and feathers
effect in action in UK PTD fuel prices. A number of theoretical explanations for such
asymmetry may be found in the literature, many of which invoke oligopolistic competition
(BCG) or nonlinear search effort (Johnson, 2002).
At this stage it seems that our results have relatively unambiguous consumer welfare
and antitrust implications but it remains to be seen if these are robust to the analysis of
ITD prices. The results of NARDL estimation for the ITD case are reported in the right
columns of Tables 2 and Figure 2. Three striking results emerge: (i.) ITD road fuel prices
are much less responsive to the crude oil market than the ITD prices of non-road fuels; (ii.)
ITD prices adjust much more slowly than PTD prices; and (iii.) ITD price adjustment is
symmetric in all cases except kerosene, which has the smallest and least variable duty/VAT
component.
The first two points can be attributed in large part to the escalator system which created
an upward drift in ITD prices independent of the price of crude oil. As mentioned above,
this may create the impression that energy prices are relatively unresponsive to the crude
oil market among consumers that only observe ITD prices. However, it is the third point
which is of particular interest, as it suggests that VAT and duty adjustments may have had
considerable effects on energy pricing decisions, with the implication that British consumers
facing ITD prices are largely insulated from asymmetries at the pump.9 This effect may
result in part from the use of discretionary changes in VAT and duty to offset negative oil
supply shocks, for example. This finding complicates the welfare and antitrust implications
arising from the analysis of PTD prices. Indeed, it raises the intriguing possibility that
if firms engage in focal point pricing using the ITD price, then they may adjust PTD
prices asymmetrically in order to achieve a desired path of ITD prices. This suggests that
9During our sample period, changes of at least 0.25ppl in the implied duty in our dataset occurred fourteen
times for unleaded and derv, twice for kerosene and eight times for gas oil. Meanwhile, the standard rate
of VAT was reduced from 17.5% to 15% from 2008m12–2009m12 inclusive (although this was offset for
unleaded petrol and derv by a simultaneous 2ppl increase in duty), and subsequently increased to 20% in
2011m01.
9
oligopolistically competitive firms may have been able to exploit the tax system to conceal
coordinated rent-seeking asymmetric PTD price adjustments behind symmetric adjustments
of listed ITD prices. The industry is currently under intense scrutiny over the alleged
manipulation of oil prices by BP and Shell so the possibility of antitrust issues at the retail
level should be of immediate concern to regulators.
Our results raise a general concern about the design of tax policies aimed at curbing the
consumption of price-inelastic goods. Escalator-type policies have been widely used in the
UK, with the ‘vice tax’ on alcohol and tobacco being a current high profile example. However,
our results indicate that such tax systems may distort the information content of listed
ITD prices, thereby hampering the ability of consumers to extract signals about the pricing
policies of distributors. Particularly in oligopolistic markets this provides considerable scope
for collusion to the detriment of consumer welfare.
4. Concluding Remarks
Using the Nonlinear ARDL framework developed by SYG, we have found strong evidence
of the rockets and feathers effect in action in three out of four major PTD fuel markets in
the UK. As with Bacon’s (1991) original study, this raises issues of rent-seeking under
oligopolistic coordination. However, our results raise the further intriguing possibility that
firms may have exploited UK tax legislation to conceal asymmetric pricing behaviour. The
difference in the extent and pattern of pass-through into PTD and ITD prices suggests that
existing studies that focus on just one of the two (usually PTD as opposed to ITD) may
miss an important aspect of the nature of price adjustment in the retail energy industry.
Our results also raise serious concerns over the design of escalator systems for the taxation
of socially undesirable price-inelastic goods.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the Editor, Badi Baltagi, and to one anonymous referee. We have
benefitted from the insightful discussion of Raphael Brun-Aguerre, David Byrne, Ana-Maria
Fuertes, John Hunter, Minjoo Kim, Gordon Leslie, Camilla Mastromarco, Viet Nguyen,
10
Kevin Reilly, Laura Serlenga, Ron Smith and Till van Treeck. Greenwood-Nimmo acknowl-
edges the hospitality and financial support of the University of York during a sequence of
visits in which much of the work in this paper was conducted.
11
Literature Cited
Asplund M, Eriksson R, Friberg R. 2000. Price adjustment by a gasoline retail chain.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102: 101-121.
Bachmeier LJ, Griffin JM. 2003. New evidence on asymmetric gasoline price responses. The
Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 772-776.
Bacon RW. 1991. Rockets and feathers: The asymmetric speed of adjustment of UK retail
gasoline prices to cost changes. Energy Economics 13: 211-218.
Balke NS, Brown SP, Yu¨cel MK. 1998. Crude oil and gasoline prices: An asymmetric
relationship? Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic and Financial Policy Review
Q1: 2-11.
Banerjee A, Dolado J, Galbraith JW, Hendry DF. 1993. Co-integration, error correction,
and the econometric analysis of non-stationary data. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Banerjee A, Dolado J, Mestre R. 1998. Error-correction mechanism tests for cointegration
in a single-equation framework. Journal of Time Series Analysis 19: 267-283.
Borenstein S, Cameron C, Gilbert R. 1997. Do gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to
crude oil price changes? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 305-339.
Borenstein S, Shepard A. 2002. Sticky prices, inventories, and market power in wholesale
gasoline markets. Rand Journal of Economics 33: 116-139.
Galeotti M, Lanza A, Manera M. 2003. Rockets and feathers revisited: An international
comparison on European gasoline markets. Energy Economics 25: 175-190.
Granger CWJ, Yoon G. 2002. Hidden cointegration. Mimeo: University of California San
Diego.
Grasso M, Manera M. 2007. Asymmetric error correction models for the oil-gasoline price
relationship. Energy Policy 35: 156-177.
Honarvar, A. 2009. Asymmetry in retail gasoline and crude oil price movements in the
United States: An application of hidden cointegration technique. Energy Economics 31:
395-402.
Johnson RN. 2002. Search costs, lags and prices at the pump. Review of Industrial Organi-
zation 20: 33-50.
Pesaran MH, Shin Y. 1998. An autoregressive distributed lag modelling approach to cointe-
gration analysis. In Econometrics and Economic Theory: The Ragnar Frisch Centennial
Symposium, Strom S (ed.). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Pesaran MH, Shin Y, Smith RJ. 2001. Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level
relationships. Journal of Applied Econometrics 16: 289-326.
Radchenko S. 2005. Oil price volatility and the asymmetric response of gasoline prices to
oil price increases and decreases. Energy Economics 27: 708-730.
Reilly B, Witt R. 1998. Petrol price asymmetries revisited. Energy Economics 20: 297-308.
Shin Y, Yu B. and Greenwood-Nimmo, M.J. 2013. Modelling Asymmetric Cointegration
and Dynamic Multipliers in a Nonlinear ARDL Framework. In Festschrift in Honor of
Peter Schmidt, William C. Horrace and Robin C. Sickles (Eds.). Springer Science &
Business Media: New York.
12
po p
PTD
unld p
PTD
derv p
PTD
krsn p
PTD
gasl p
ITD
unld p
ITD
derv p
ITD
krsn p
ITD
gasl
Mean 61.71 9.80 10.64 39.76 29.20 38.75 50.14 39.76 38.29
Std. Dev. 35.62 10.01 10.33 28.69 26.45 26.84 27.35 28.66 32.56
Skewness 0.89 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.42 0.88 0.17 0.12
Kurtosis 2.02 -0.48 0.31 -0.31 -0.38 0.31 1.72 -0.30 -0.48
Notes: po denotes the Brent crude oil price converted from US$/bbl to £/bbl. In all
cases, the reported statistics are computed using the indexed representation of the data
(2000Y=100) before it is logged for estimation.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Annual Rate of Inflation of Each Variable
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1
pi
−j
0.31
7.65
∗∗∗
4.07
∗∗
10.75
∗∗∗
0.03
0.32
3.74
∗
0.04
D
ia
gn
o
stics
F
P
S
S
13.82
∗∗∗
25.88
∗∗∗
18.58
∗∗∗
22.56
∗∗∗
3.04
6.06
∗∗
17.48
∗∗∗
6.64
∗∗
t
B
D
M
-6.37
∗∗∗
-8.50
∗∗∗
-7.07
∗∗∗
-7.37
∗∗∗
-2.41
-3.72
∗∗
-6.82
∗∗∗
-3.91
∗∗∗
B
G
T
est
(N
R
2)
15.96
15.47
8.76
4.40
14.19
7.07
8.99
7.39
R¯
2
0.70
0.64
0.65
0.67
0.65
0.59
0.66
0.66
N
o
t
e
s:
T
he
notation
for
the
estim
ated
coeffi
cients
relates
to
E
quation
(2.4).
T
he
three
reported
sym
m
etry
tests
are
standard
W
ald
tests.
T
he
B
G
test
is
the
B
reusch-G
odfrey
serialcorrelation
test. ∗∗∗
denotes
significance
at
the
1%
level,
∗∗
the
5%
level
and
∗
the
10%
level.
T
he
relevant
k
=
1
criticalvalues
reported
by
P
SS
for
the
t
B
D
M
statistic
are
-2.91
-3.22
-3.82
at
the
10%
,
5%
and
1%
levels.
T
he
equivalent
criticalvalues
for
the
F
P
S
S
statistic
are
4.78,5.73
and
7.84.
T
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N
A
R
D
L
E
stim
ation
R
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(a) Crude Oil Spot Price (GBP/bbl)
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Figure 1: The Proportion of VAT and Duty by Product
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Figure 2: Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers. The solid (dashed) black line is the cumulative dynamic multi-
plier with respect to a 1% positive (negative) change in the oil price while th heavy dashed red line plots the
difference between the two. The light dashed red lines report the two standard error confidence interval for
the difference line computed by stochastic simulation. Tick marks on the horizontal axis represent 3 month
intervals while the vertical axis is in percentage points.
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